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Abstract. In this paper, we present a methodology to produce veri-
fied OCaml libraries, using the GOSPEL specification language and the
Why3 program verification tool. First, a formal behavioral specification
of the library is written in OCaml/GOSPEL, in the form of an OCaml
module signature extended with type invariants and function contracts.
Second, an implementation is written in WhyML, the programming lan-
guage of Why3, and then verified with respect to the GOSPEL speci-
fication. Finally, WhyML code is automatically translated into OCaml
source code by Why3. Our methodology is illustrated with two examples:
first, a small binary search function; then, a union-find data structure
that is part of a larger OCaml verified library.
1 Introduction
Development of formally verified programs can be done in various ways. Per-
haps, the most widespread approach consists in augmenting an existing main-
stream programming language with specification annotations (contracts, invari-
ants, etc.) and proving the conformance of the code to the specification, possibly
passing through an intermediate language. Examples include VeriFast [17] and
KeY [2] for Java, Frama-C [19] and VCC (via Boogie) [12,3] for C, GNATprove
(via Why3) for Ada/SPARK [6,16]. This approach can end up being quite chal-
lenging, since real-life programming languages, not designed with verification in
mind, have to be encoded into a suitable program logic. Such an encoding is a
non-trivial task, and it may result in rather complex verification conditions, that
are difficult to discharge by both automated and interactive provers.
Alternatively, one can proceed in the opposite direction: develop formally ver-
ified code in a dedicated verification language/environment and then translate it
to an existing programming language, producing a correct-by-construction pro-
gram. One can cite PVS [22], Coq [28], B [1], F? [27], Dafny [20], and Why3 [13]
as examples of this approach. It works well for self-contained programs, such as
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CompCert [21], but is less suitable when the verified code is supposed to be in-
tegrated into a larger development. We cannot expect the original source code,
developed in a specific verification framework, to be accessible to a common
programmer  and the automatically generated code is typically a clobbered
mess.
In this paper, we propose a way to reconcile the two approaches, avoiding
both of the aforementioned disadvantages. Our work takes place in the setting of
a larger project, named VOCaL (for Verified OCaml Library) [9], whose ambition
is to provide a mechanically verified library of efficient general-purpose data
structures and algorithms, written in the OCaml language. One of the main
lines of work in the VOCaL project is the design of GOSPEL [8], a behavioral
specification language for OCaml, similar to what JML is for Java [5], or ACSL
for C [4]. The VOCaL project also combines the use of three verification tools,
namely Coq, CFML [7], and Why3. This paper focuses on the last.
Our approach to producing verified OCaml code consists in splitting the ver-
ification and implementation process into several steps. The workflow is given in
Fig. 1: solid rectangles represent user-written files, and dashed rectangles repre-
sent automatically generated files. First, we start with a GOSPEL specification
file: an OCaml .mli interface file where OCaml declarations are augmented with
specification annotations, such as function contracts (pre- and postconditions)
and type invariants. GOSPEL annotations are written as OCaml comments, and
thus ignored by the OCaml compiler. Our framework parses and type checks this
file and automatically generates a corresponding Why3 input file, in which all
annotations are translated into WhyML, the specification and programming lan-
guage of Why3. Second, we provide a verified WhyML implementation of the
declared operations. This means that, in addition to implementing and verifying
a WhyML program, we also establish its correctness with respect to the specifi-
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cations given in the .mli file. Finally, the Why3 tool automatically translates the
verified WhyML implementation into a correct-by-construction OCaml program.
In the following sections, we explain this workflow in detail using the ex-
amples of a binary search function (Sec. 2 and 3) and of a union-find library
(Sec. 4). Section 5 gives an overview of the other OCaml modules verified with
Why3 in the VOCaL project. Source files for all the OCaml modules mentioned
in this paper are available from https://vocal.lri.fr/.
2 Why3 and WhyML
Why3 is a tool for deductive program verification [16]. It uses its own program-
ming and specification language, called WhyML, which is largely inspired by
OCaml syntax. The theoretical foundation of Why3 is the weakest-precondition
calculus and a custom type system with regions to handle mutable heap-allocated
data [14]. As a programming language, WhyML can be seen as a subset of OCaml
with support for exceptions, algebraic types, type polymorphism, and restricted
higher-order (side-effect-free functional arguments). The program annotations
(function contracts, loop invariants, assertions, etc.) are written in a rich logical
language that reuses the data types of programs and features pattern matching,
recursive and inductive definitions, as well as higher-order functions. An impor-
tant feature of WhyML is so-called ghost code which is a part of program code
that serves exclusively to facilitate specification and proof, and cannot influence
the actual computations [15]. For example, complex data structures in WhyML
would often feature ghost fields that contain the logical model of the structure.
This allows us to specify the program functions that manipulate such a data
type in terms of a simple mathematical model, without referring to the details
of the implementation.
Let us illustrate the use of Why3 on the simple example of a binary search
function. It can be specified and implemented in WhyML as follows:
let rec binary_search (cmp: 'a -> 'a -> int63)
(a: array 'a) (lo hi: int63) (v: 'a) : int63
requires { is_pre_order cmp }
requires { 0 <= lo <= hi <= length a }
requires { forall i j. lo <= i <= j < hi -> cmp a[i] a[j] <= 0 }
ensures { lo <= result < hi /\ cmp a[result] v = 0 }
raises { Not_found ->
forall i. lo <= i < hi -> cmp a[i] v <> 0 }
variant { hi - lo }
=
if lo >= hi then raise Not_found;
let mid = lo + (hi - lo) / 2 in
let c = cmp a[mid] v in
if c < 0 then binary_search cmp a (mid + 1) hi v
else if c > 0 then binary_search cmp a lo mid v
else mid
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The first two lines show the type signature of the function binary_search. The
functional parameter cmp must be a total stateless and effect-free function, so
that we can use it in specification annotations. Type int63 denotes the 63-bit
signed integers and is distinguished from type int that represents unbounded
mathematical integers. The values of range types like int63 are implicitly co-
erced to int inside specification annotations.
After the type signature comes the function contract. The clauses requires
correspond to the preconditions: the functional parameter cmp is required to im-
plement a total pre-order (the sign of the return value indicates the result of
the comparison); the range lo..hi must lie inside the array bounds; the array
must be ordered within that range. The clause ensures describes the postcondi-
tion associated to a normal (i.e., non-exceptional) termination: the return value
of type int63, named result, must be a valid array index where the sought
value v is stored. The clause raises describes the exceptional postcondition: if
binary_search raises exception Not_found, then v does not occur in the array
between lo and hi. Finally, the last clause, variant, is not part of the contract,
but helps Why3 to prove the termination: with each recursive call, the value of
the variant must strictly decrease with respect to some well-founded order.
The code of binary_search is a rather idiomatic OCaml code. When we
run Why3 on this program, verification conditions are generated to prove the
following properties:
 all function calls respect the preconditions of the callee (this includes showing
that all operations over bounded integers do not produce overflows and that
all array accesses are made within bounds);
 all recursive function calls make the value of the variant decrease;
 the postconditions are met both for normal and exceptional termination.
Why3 uses multiple automated and interactive provers (including Alt-Ergo,
CVC4, Z3, E, Coq, and Isabelle) to discharge the proof obligations. Moreover,
the user can apply various transformations, such as goal splitting, case analysis,
and definition unfolding, during a Why3 interactive verification session in order
to simplify proof tasks before sending them to the background provers. For ex-
ample, the above implementation of binary search is proved automatically by
CVC4 in a matter of seconds after one application of goal splitting.
Why3 supports automated translation of WhyML code to OCaml. An impor-
tant part of this translation is removal of ghost code and ghost data. Once ghost
code and specification annotations are eliminated, Why3 produces an OCaml
source file. The program symbols and types which are not implemented inside
WhyML code (and are axiomatized instead) are translated to their OCaml coun-
terparts via a so-called driver : a text file that maps WhyML symbols to frag-
ments of OCaml code. Drivers are part of the trusted base of Why3: an incorrect
translation would result in a program whose behaviour is different from that of
the verified WhyML code and will not necessarily respect the contract. In the
example above, the types int63 and array, as well as standard operations over
them, are mapped to the corresponding OCaml types and operations. The re-
sulting OCaml code is practically identical to the WhyML source.
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3 GOSPEL and its Translation to WhyML
The specification language GOSPEL [8] was developed in the context of the VO-
CaL project. It extends the syntax of OCaml .mli interface files with behavioral
specifications, written as specially formatted OCaml comments. GOSPEL is not
tied to any particular verification tool. Instead, the methodology of VOCaL
considers GOSPEL as a common frontend specification language for different
verification tools, that either verify OCaml code directly (e.g., CFML) or can
produce correct-by-construction OCaml code (e.g., Why3 or Coq).
Here is the GOSPEL specification for our binary_search function:
val binary_search:
('a -> 'a -> int) -> 'a array -> int -> int -> 'a -> int
(** Search for value [v] in array [a], between indices [lo]
inclusive and [hi] exclusive, using comparison function [cmp].
Returns an index where [v] occurs, or raises [Not_found]
if no such index exists. *)
(*@ result = binary_search cmp a lo hi v
requires is_pre_order cmp
checks 0 <= lo <= hi <= Array.length a
requires forall i j. lo <= i <= j < hi -> cmp a.(i) a.(j) <= 0
ensures lo <= result < hi && cmp a.(result) v = 0
raises Not_found ->
forall i. lo <= i < hi -> cmp a.(i) v <> 0 *)
The file begins with a standard OCaml function declaration, together with an
informal ocamldoc comment. Then follows the formal specification, enclosed in
a special comment starting with `(*@'. The first line of the specification gives
names to the function parameters and to its return value. Wherever possible,
GOSPEL uses OCaml syntax for primitive operations (e.g., Boolean connectives
and array access).
A notable difference with the WhyML specification from the previous section
is clause checks, which describes a precondition that is expected to be checked
during execution. When such a precondition is violated, the OCaml implemen-
tation must raise the OCaml built-in exception Invalid_argument. Contrary to
JML or SPARK, GOSPEL annotations are not meant to be executable: they
may contain unbounded quantifiers, abstract logical functions, etc. It is up to
the verified OCaml implementation to fulfill the provided contract, including the
runtime checks.
Although the semantics of GOSPEL is given in terms of Separation Logic [8],
the specification language itself is kept simple, without explicit Separation Logic
operators. Instead, GOSPEL adopts a number of reasonable conventions, such
as separation of function parameters and return values, and full ownership trans-
mission from the caller to the callee and back. This is done intentionally, in order
to make the language accessible to a larger audience of OCaml programmers.
Incidentally, this also simplifies translation from GOSPEL to WhyML, which
adheres to the same conventions [14].
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We have extended Why3 with a new input format for GOSPEL. The type
and function declarations are translated to corresponding WhyML declarations.
A special treatment is provided for checks clauses: for each function foo whose
contract contains a clause checks φ, Why3 produces the declarations of two
WhyML functions, foo and unsafe_foo, where the former contains an excep-
tional postcondition raises { Invalid_argument -> ¬φ } and the latter con-
tains a precondition requires { φ }. The latter function is deemed unsafe be-
cause it trusts the caller to respect the precondition φ, whereas the former im-
plements a defensive runtime check. A similar practice already exists in OCaml,
e.g., Array.unsafe_get. Unsafe functions are perfectly safe when called from
verified code, since precondition must be satisfied, and provide a better perfor-
mance.
Why3 can generate proof obligations to establish that a given WhyML imple-
mentation conforms to a given WhyML specification translated from GOSPEL.
In our case, we can show that our implementation of binary search from Sec. 2
corresponds to the declaration of function unsafe_binary_search (where the
checks clause is translated as a WhyML precondition).
4 Example: Union-Find
We now describe a more complex example, taken from the VOCaL library. This is
an OCaml module implementing a union-find data structure, with the following
API (borrowed from [10]):
type 'a elem (* type of the elements *)
val make: 'a -> 'a elem (* a singleton class *)
val find: 'a elem -> 'a elem (* the representative *)
val eq: 'a elem -> 'a elem -> bool (* in the same class? *)
val union: 'a elem -> 'a elem -> unit (* merge two classes *)
In this API, a value of type 'a is attached to each equivalence class. Our actual
implementation includes the access and update functions to manipulate this
value. For the sake of brevity, we do not discuss this functionality in the paper.
Specification. We start with a GOSPEL specification. In order to give a spec-
ification to the functions above, we need a logical representation of the global
state of the union-find data structure. This logical representation takes the form
of a set of all elements, together with a function selecting a canonical element in
each equivalence class:
(*@ type 'a uf
mutable model dom: 'a elem set
mutable model rep: 'a elem -> 'a elem
invariant forall x. mem x dom -> rep (rep x) = rep x
invariant forall x. mem x dom -> mem (rep x) dom *)
Notice that type uf is declared inside a GOSPEL annotation and not as an
OCaml type. Consequently, it will only be available for specification or as a type
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of ghost parameters. The fields dom and rep are declared mutable to reflect
the possible changes in the state of the union-find structure. The two invariants
ensure that the set dom is indeed partitioned by the relation to have the same
canonical representative given by rep.
We are now in position to provide a specification to each OCaml function
above. Let us use make and find as examples.
val make: 'a -> 'a elem
(*@ e = make [uf: 'a uf] v
modifies uf
ensures not (mem e (dom (old uf)))
ensures dom uf = add e (dom (old uf))
ensures rep uf = (rep (old uf))[e <- e] *)
val find: 'a elem -> 'a elem
(*@ r = find [uf: 'a uf] e
requires mem e (dom uf)
modifies uf
ensures dom uf = dom (old uf)
ensures rep uf = rep (old uf)
ensures r = rep uf e *)
For the purpose of the specification, make and find receive an extra parameter
uf of type 'a uf. Square brackets identify it as a ghost parameter. The modifies
clause in the function contract accounts for the modification of the union-find
data structure (caused by path compression in the case of find). The term
old uf refers to the state of the structure at the beginning of the function call.
Verified Implementation. The next step is to implement and verify the union-find
data structure. The OCaml implementation we target is based on the following
data types:
type 'a content = Link of 'a elem | Root of int * 'a
and 'a elem = 'a content ref
Each element is a mutable reference which can be in one of two states: either it
is a canonical element (Root), with a rank of type int and a value of type 'a;
or it points (Link) to another element in the same equivalence class.
This type definition cannot be used as is in WhyML, which does not support
recursive mutable types. The solution in Why3 is to resort to an explicit mem-
ory model, that is a set of types and operations to model the heap, pointers,
allocation, and memory access. We translate the OCaml types above into the
following WhyML types
type loc_ref 'a
type content 'a = Link (elem 'a) | Root int63 'a
with elem 'a = loc_ref (content 'a)
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where loc_ref 'a is an abstract immutable type to represent locations of OCaml's
heap-allocated references of type ref. The contents of the heap is modeled with
another WhyML type
type mem_ref 'b = private {mutable refs: loc_ref 'b -> option 'b}
where non-allocated locations are mapped to None, and each allocated location
is mapped to Some c for some value c of type 'b.
Instead of modeling a single global heap, we adopt an approach of small
heaps, i.e., local chunks of memory, which are passed as ghost arguments to
heap-manipulating functions [23, Chapter 5]. For instance, a reference is updated
using the following function:
val set_ref (ghost mem: mem_ref 'b) (l: loc_ref 'b) (c: 'b): unit
requires { mem.refs l <> None }
writes { mem }
ensures { mem.refs = (old mem.refs)[l <- Some c] }
Once this memory model is built, we can implement and verify the union-
find data structure. In particular, we have to implement the data type uf. It
is a record data type that contains, in addition to the fields dom and rep, the
contents of the memory:
type uf 'a = { memo: mem_ref (content 'a); ... }
As declared in the interface, all union-find functions receive a ghost parameter
of type uf and then exploit it to perform read/write operations on memory:
let rec find (ghost uf: uf 'a) (x: elem 'a) : elem 'a
= match get_ref uf.memo x with
| Root _ _ -> x
| Link y -> let rx = find uf y in
set_ref uf.memo x (Link rx); rx end
Here, the call to set_ref accounts for path compression. Once we have imple-
mented all operations, we prove that they conform to the GOSPEL specification
written in the .mli file and translated to WhyML by our tool.
Translation to OCaml. The last step consists in translating WhyML to OCaml.
We extend the standard driver of Why3 with a custom driver file for our memory
model, as follows:
module UnionFind.Mem
syntax type loc_ref "%1 ref"
syntax val set_ref "%1 := %2"
...
We do not provide a translation for type mem_ref, since it is only used for ghost
parameters. For the same reason, function set_ref only receives two parameters
in the translated code. Such a file must be written with care, as it is clearly part
of the trusted base. In particular, we trust OCaml references to have the same
semantics as the one described in our memory model.
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module spec code #VCs
UnionFind 71 176 92 union-find
Vector 142 285 63 resizable arrays
PriorityQueue 56 290 219 mutable priority queues
PairingHeap 43 244 66 persistent priority queues
ZipperList 65 150 54 zipper data structure for lists
Arrays 43 126 104 e.g., binary search, binary sort
Mjrty 11 35 37 Boyer&Moore's majority
RingBuffer 44 94 61 circular arrays
CountingSort 19 80 128 array counting sort
Fig. 2. Verified OCaml Modules.
5 The VOCaL Project: The State of the Library
We have used our approach to verify several other OCaml modules, listed in
Fig. 2. For each OCaml module, column spec shows the number of lines in
the .mli file and column code shows the number of lines in the WhyML im-
plementation and proof. Column #VCs shows the total number of verification
conditions. All of them were discharged automatically using the combined effort
of Alt-Ergo, CVC4, and Z3.
These examples involve many aspects not described in this paper, due to lack
of space. We describe some of them, briefly:
 One module, PriorityQueue, implements mutable priority queues on top
of another module, Vector, which implements resizable arrays. The proof is
performed in a modular way: the Why3 proof of PriorityQueue only makes
use of the GOSPEL specification for Vector, but not of its implementation.
 Modules PriorityQueue and PairingHeap are OCaml functors, i.e., mod-
ules parameterized by a module. This is the idiomatic way in OCaml to pro-
vide types and functions as parameters (here, a type of elements equipped
with a comparison function). From GOSPEL's point of view, there is no
difference between the specification of a parameter module and that of a
toplevel module. From Why3's point of view, there is no difference between
verifying a module B that uses another module A or that is parameterized
with a module A. The main difference lies in the translation from Why3 to
OCaml, which must produce an actual OCaml functor.
 The verified module PriorityQueue has been integrated into Why3 source
code. It is not used in the trusted part of Why3, but only in some heuristic
algorithm that matches former proof attempts with new verification condi-
tions. In this way, there is no circularity in the proof of PriorityQueue.
 Two of the modules involve arithmetic computations for which it is not obvi-
ous to prove the absence of arithmetic overflow (the rank in UnionFind and
a list length in ZipperList). We use a Why3 library providing a protected
integer type with a restricted set of operations to solve that issue [11].
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The GOSPEL specification, OCaml code, and Why3 proof for all these modules
is available from https://vocal.lri.fr/.
6 Related Work and Conclusion
Related Work. The verified C compiler CompCert [21] and the static analyzer
Verasco [18] are two notable large-scale examples of verified OCaml programs.
Both are implemented in the Coq proof assistant and translated to OCaml after-
wards using Coq extraction mechanism [26]. It is worth pointing out that Coq
has a mechanism to replace certain symbols by OCaml code at extraction time,
in a way very similar to our driver substitution mechanism.
The CFML tool [7] implements another approach to the verification of OCaml
programs using Coq. It goes the other way around, turning an OCaml program
into a characteristic formula, that is an expression of its semantics into a higher-
order separation logic embedded in Coq. CFML provides Coq tactics to help the
user carry out proofs efficiently. Examples of recent applications of CFML include
a verified implementation of hash tables [25] and verification of the correctness
and amortized complexity of a union-find library [10]. Contrary to the CFML
proof, ours is fully automatic but we only treat functional correctness and not
the complexity bounds.
Surprisingly, program verification has seldom been applied to libraries of sig-
nificant size. A remarkable exception is the verification of the EiffelBase2 con-
tainers library [24], performed with the AutoProof system [29]. It is our purpose
to continue using and improving our methodology to grow our verified library to
a size comparable to that of EiffelBase2. However, we do not focus specifically
on the verification of containers, but also on general-purpose algorithms, e.g.,
our union-find implementation.
Conclusion. We proposed a new workflow to produce correct-by-construction
OCaml programs. It builds upon the existing tool Why3, with the addition of
the following contributions: a specification language for OCaml, called GOSPEL;
a tool to translate it to WhyML; a technique to build memory models for mutable
recursive OCaml types; an enhanced extraction mechanism for Why3, with sup-
port for OCaml functors; a practical validation with the proof of nine non-trivial
OCaml modules.
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